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My dissertation has two main aims. First, I argue that moral responsibility is not compatible 
with determinism. Second, I attempt to describe the outline of the metaphysics of moral 
responsibility. I claim that there are morally responsible people only if agents are substances 
who are irreducible to the sum of their properties. Furthermore, I argue, there is moral 
responsibility only if agents have decisions that are made in situations in which natural laws 
and the properties of the agents outline only the alternatives while the agents as substances 
determine which option takes place. These free decisions have a curious feature: the open 
alternatives have no metaphysically robust ground-floor probabilities prior to the decision.  
In the first part of the first chapter, I attempt to confute the main variants of normative 
compatibilism using ethical examples and thought experiments (1.2.). I call theories 
normative compatibilism according to which determinism and moral responsibility are 
compatible with each other because one is blameworthy in any situation in which blaming the 
agent is useful (1.2.1.), appropriate in a contractualist framework (1.2.2.), or fair (1.2.3.).   
In the second part of the first chapter after the rejection of these theories, I analyze the 
concept of desert showing the main features of the desert-theory of moral responsibility. 
According to this approach, one is morally responsible for X if and only if she deserves moral 
blame or praise for X insofar as X was morally bad or good (1.3.). Besides the fact that the 
notion of desert has received less attention than it would be reasonable regarding the structure 
of the problem of moral responsibility, I consider this analysis of the notion of desert (1.3.1-
1.3.2.) to be especially relevant since the desert-theory of moral responsibility provides the 
ethical basis of incompatibilism. 
In section 1.4, after I describe the main features and different versions of the desert-
theory of moral responsibility (1.3.3.), I face the strongest argument against it. According to 
the argument, desert-theory of moral responsibility has an unacceptable consequence. 
Namely, blaming or punishing the offender is intrinsically good because she deserves 
suffering. Firstly, I show the real consequence of the approach. Secondly, I argue this 
consequence is not unacceptable at all.  
In the end of the chapter, I provide two further arguments for the desert-theory of 
moral responsibility which are not based on failures of other approaches. The first argues that 
the desert-theory fits the characteristics of moral blame and praise well (1.5.1.). The second 
claims that one has a plausible explanation of some features of the discourses about moral 
responsibility only if she chooses the desert-theory of moral responsibility (1.5.2.).   
In the second chapter, I refute the compatibilist theories which can be interpreted in 
such a way that they claim that having specific properties can be the ultimate desert base of 
blame and praise even if it is not the agent’s fault that she has the property in question. I 
claim that Strawsionian and one-way compatibilism should be interpreted in this way. The 
former claims the following: because the actual moral practice justifies itself, agents deserve 
blame for having a morally problematic property even if it is not their fault. The reason is 
simple: it is compatible with the everyday moral practice that people blame others for having 
a property regardless of what is the cause of having the property in question. According to the 
latter theories, the reason why moral responsibility is compatible with determinism is that 
agents are morally responsible for having some morally relevant properties and for actions 
which stand in the appropriate relation with the mentioned properties even if these properties, 
for example having a particular bad characteristic feature,  are not the agents’ fault. 
My main counter-argument against the naturalist accounts of moral responsibility is 
that moral relativism follows from this kind of theory and moral relativism is implausible 
with regard to moral responsibility (2.2.). If one claims that the fundamental parts of our 
moral practices justify themselves, and she is aware of that blaming practices of different 
cultures are in conflict, she has to accept that every moral practice with regard to moral 
responsibility is right. So in different cultures, people deserve blame for different actions, 
which means a person’s blameworthiness depends on the culture in which the person lives. It 
seems to be implausible. 
After criticizing the naturalist accounts of moral responsibility, I reconstruct the one-
way compatibilist theories of moral responsibility (2.3.). In the following section (2.4.), I 
argue that although these theories are seemingly able to explain well how agents can be 
responsible for many different types of actions and properties, such as omissions, desires, 
beliefs, emotions, characteristics and so on, this advantage is illusory since the provided 
explanation does not fit our fundamental ethical convictions and practices (2.4.).    
In section 2.5., I construct two arguments against one-way compatibilism. The first 
one is the isolation-argument which has the aim to show how implausible the claim is that 
agents may be responsible for their characteristics and for their actions which are inevitable 
consequences of their characteristics regardless of the antecedent events which explain why 
the agents have the morally problematic characteristic (2.5.2.). The second argument is based 
on the analysis of moral blame (2.5.3.). According to the argument, moral blame includes the 
thought that the basis of blame is the blamed person’s fault. That is why moral blame can be 
deserved only if the basis of blame is in fact  the blamed person’s fault. Thus, the one-way 
compatibilism is wrong because it follows from the theory that one can be blameworthy for 
properties which are not her fault. This chapter argues against two notable versions of 
compatibilism; besides, it is relevant with regard to the whole train of thought of the 
dissertation because it makes clear by the analysis of moral blame why the incompatibilists 
are right about that agents must have strong control over the basis of blame to be 
blameworthy. If agents are blameworthy only for their faults, and only features which are 
strongly controlled by the agent can be the blamed person’s fault, any agent can be 
blameworthy only for the features which are strongly controlled by the agent (2.6.).  
In the third chapter, I directly argue for the two main claims of the dissertation. The 
first one: if one holds a plausible interpretation of natural laws, she has to claim that 
deterministic laws are incompatible with moral responsibility. The second one: enhanced 
control which is needed for moral responsibility is possible only if agents are such substances 
whose causal powers cannot be reduced to the causal powers of their properties, and they are 
able to control the usage of their specific causal power in a way that it is not possible to 
attribute metaphysically robust ground-floor probabilities to any open alternatives.  
I start from a widely accepted thought according to which anything can be fault of an 
agent only if the agent exercises strong control over their actions, omissions or properties 
(3.1.). That is the reason why the understanding of control and enhanced control are the key 
for the problem of moral responsibility. Accordingly, in the next section (3.2.), I analyze the 
notion of control. I argue for two, closely related claims. The first one says that the best 
control-theory is the effect-theory of control (3.2.1−3.2.5.). According to this approach, the 
control-relation is based on to what extent the controller is able to affect the controlled being. 
The second claim is that only one explanation can satisfy the fact why humans, in contrast to  
− for example – present-day machines, have enhanced control, which is the condition of 
moral responsibility. Namely, the explanation according to which only humans are able to 
control which optional course of events is started by them (3.2.6-3.2.7.) is that one. The 
control that is the ultimate and direct control over which course of events is started by the 
agent is the crucial condition of having enhanced control. After the analysis of the notion of 
control, I explain to what extent ultimate and direct control is the condition of enhanced 
control and moral responsibility (3.3.). 
Based on the results of the analysis of control, I outline the metaphysics of free 
decisions which are the ultimate source of moral responsibility (3.4.). I argue for that one can 
comprehend what the difference is between free decisions and random events if it is supposed 
that the agent is a substance who has more than one open alternative with regard to how she 
exercises her special irreducible causal power to determine which course of events starts. 
After describing the main features of the theory (3.4.1.), I attempt to show that two claims 
about the metaphysics of decisions are true. Firstly, the presence of ground-floor probabilities 
and the ultimate direct control are incompatible (3.4.2.). Secondly, the lack of ground-floor 
probabilities can be explained by the metaphysics of agent-causation only. It means that 
neither the solution of non-causal libertarianism nor the account of event-causal 
libertarianism work. In the first case, if the non-causal libertarian claims that free decisions 
have no causes, she cannot explain plausibly what the difference is between random events 
without causes and free decisions. In the latter case, if the event-causal libertarian holds that 
free decisions are indeterministically caused by events, she is unable to explain what the 
relevant difference is between indeterministic chain of events and free decisions.      
After describing the metaphysics of free decisions, I return to dealing with the 
compatibility problem of moral responsibility and determinism (3.5.). Based on the result of 
the previous analysis claiming that ultimate direct control is a condition for moral 
responsibility, I argue neither two-way compatibilism (3.5.1.) nor semi-compatibilism (3.5.2.) 
are able to explain moral responsibility. Although two-way compatibilism accepts the thesis 
that open alternative possibilities are necessary conditions for moral responsibility, it cannot 
show how the ultimate direct control and determinism could be compatible with each other. 
If, as I argue, possessing ultimate direct control means that the agent is able to start one of the 
open alternatives of course of events whereas the past, the natural laws and the given 
situation are fixed, the deterministic natural laws rule out this kind of control because they 
allow to start only one course of events without breaking the natural laws in every situation.    
Even though semi-compatibilism does not face this problem since it holds neither free 
will nor ultimate direct control is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, it is unable to 
show how agents have such enhanced control which can explain why only humans, as 
opposed to – for example – machines, are able to be responsible for properties, actions and 
omissions. Although semi-compatibilism is right about that agents’ reason-responsiveness 
means a relevant difference between present-day machines and agents, this difference is able 
to provide explanation why people can control more types of events than machines.  
In the last section, I summarize the train of thought which is against compatibilism 
and can be traced through the whole dissertation (3.5.3.). According to this argument, 
determinism rules out moral responsibility because it allows only “mechanistic” reactions. It 
means that if the natural laws are deterministic, every being can react to any stimulus in only 
one way in any given situation. Consequently, every being controls to the same extent which 
course of events is facilitated as a reaction to a stimulus in the given situation by the being in 
question.  And if every being controls their reactions to the same extent, humans do not have 
a stronger control over their reactions than our favorite tools which are considered that 
reliable just because we know which one is the only possible way for them to react to any 
stimulus. However, if we are unable to control our reactions better than our tools are able to 
control their reactions, we are not responsible for our reactions as well as our reliable tools 
are not morally responsible for anything.   
 
